Evidence - Searches and Seizures - Admissability in Civil Case When Illegally Obtained by Private Persons by Soldberg, Wayne O.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 4 Article 12 
1964 
Evidence - Searches and Seizures - Admissability in Civil Case 
When Illegally Obtained by Private Persons 
Wayne O. Soldberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Soldberg, Wayne O. (1964) "Evidence - Searches and Seizures - Admissability in Civil Case When Illegally 
Obtained by Private Persons," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 41 : No. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss4/12 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
outside the city limits are continually under threat of the nuisance
of feed lots which may move into this area adjacent to the city.
By modifying the restricting clause, the exclusion of livestock pro-
grams from land adjacent to cities would prevent these nuisances.
Upon modification of existing statutes as suggested above, the dis-
senting opinion would be sound in result.
EDMOND REES
EVIDENCE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ADMISSABILITY IN CIVIL CASE
WHEN ILLEGALLY OBTAINED BY PRIVATE PERSONS-In a jury trial the
plaintiff was granted a divorce on the ground of his wife's adult-
ery. The wife appealed on the theory that the evidence of her
adultery should have been excluded because it was obtained by a
violation of her rights under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution.' The violation consisted of an illegal, forcible
entry into the wife's home by the husband and several of his pri-
vate investigators. The New York Court of Appeals held, two
judges dissenting, that evidence of a wife's adultery was admissable
in a divorce action even though obtained by an illegal, forcible
entry. The dissenting judges reasoned that the exclusionary rule
applied in criminal cases should be extended to civil cases where the
violation of rights was committed by a private person rather than
a governmental unit. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d
481 (1964).
The common law rule regarding admissibility of evidence was
that the court would not be concerned with how it was obtained. 2
Under this rule, evidence obtained by unreasonable search and
seizure was admissable even though the United States Constitution
forbids such invasion.3 The reason given was that crime detection
should not be needlessly burdened and that the accused's remedy
was a civil action for trespass rather than exclusion of the evi-
dence so obtained. 4 The first step toward abrogating this rule
was the exclusion of such evidence from federal courts5 and the
adoption of the exclusionary rule by a number of states through
their own constitutions." The next step came in 1949 when the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the fourth amendment was
enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
But the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure did not
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure In their persons,
houses, Papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. "
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928).
3. Supra note 1.
4. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 388 (1914).
6. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, Appendix at 224-32 (1960).
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require enforcement by excluding the evidence so obtained.7 This
decision prompted a few more states to adopt the exclusionary
rule.8  Finally, in 1961, the Court held in Mapp v. Ohio9  that
evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure was in-
admissible in state as well as federal courts.
Prior to Mapp, the history of this rule in New York was one of
definite rejection.10 A number of subsequent decisions have fol-
lowed the federal rule.1  It has, however, been narrowly con-
strued12 and applied only to criminal cases where the search and
seizure was by governmental forces.13 The court said, in People
v. Appelbaum,"4 that the constitutional provision against unlawful
search and seizure related solely to sovereign authority and its
agencies, and not to private individuals.
Since the New York courts are reluctant to exclude any evidence
that has probative value, it is likely that Mapp will be distinguish-
ed whenever possible. In the Sackler case' 5 where the evidence
was illegally obtained by a private individual in a civil suit, two
distinctions can be drawn: first, Mapp was a criminal case and
secondly, the illegal search was by governmental representatives.
Sackler was apparently decided on the theory that the constitu-
tional protection does not extend to searches by private individuals,
a proposition which has considerable supporting authority.16 There-
fore, the difficult question of whether the rule should be applied
to civil cases was avoided. The two dissenting judges, however,
would extend the protection of the fourth amendment to illegal
search and seizure by private persons as well as government of-
ficials and would make no distinction between civil and criminal
cases.1 The case of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,8
decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Sackler lends support
to the theory that there should be no distinction between civil and
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. Elkins v. United States, supra note 6.
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. E.g., People v. Varlano. 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857 (1959); People v. Defore,
supra note 4; People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903).
11. E.g., People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441 (1964) People v. O'Neill,
11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95 (1962).
12. E.g., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964). Defendant suspected
of a crime was stopped and "frisked." The court said that Mapp did not apply, and the
evidence was admitted. Judge Fuld, dissenting, would expand Mapp to apply in this case.
13. Supra note 11.
14. 301 N.Y. 738, 95 N.E.2d 410 (1950).
15. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 401, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
16. E.g., Berdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) ; United States v. Jordan, 79 F.
Supp. 411 (E. D. Pa. 1948); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1963) ; People v. Appelbaum, supra note 14.
17. Sackler v. Sackler, supra note 15 at 484, 85; Cf. People v. Defore, supra note 4 at
588. Judge Cardozo said that it made no difference who made the Illegal search, private
individual or government agent, he would admit the evidence in either case. In Sackler
the dissenters also said that it made no difference who made the illegal search. They
would, however, exclude the evidence.
18. 33 U.S.L. Week 4387 (1965). In this case The United States Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment's ban on use of illegally seized evidence in state criminal
proceedings applied to a state proceeding to forfeit an automobile for transporting liquor
not bearing state tax seals. The Court held that although this was technically a civil
proceeding, it was in substance and effect a criminal action.
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criminal cases. Another possible reason for the court's decision
in the instant case is that the rigid New York divorce law lists
adultery as the only grounds for divorce. 19 Thus the exclusion of
this evidence would have precluded the plaintiff from freeing him-
self from an adulterous spouse.
2 0
The New York court has seemingly upheld the doctrine of stare
decisis and maintained judicial stability by holding that the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply when the violation is by a private individual. The
Supreme Court, however, made no such distinction in the Mapp
case and it seems incongruous to suppose that the Court simul-
taneously broadened the coverage of the fourth amendment by apply-
ing it to the states and restricted it by excluding private indivi-
duals from its prohibitions. It is difficult to see why the constitu-
tionality of an act should be determined by who commits the act
rather than by the act itself.
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19. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170.
20. See Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, 796 (1962). Judge Benja-
min Brenner of the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York, granted defendent's motion
to supress the evidence. "The divorce laws of the State of New York, confined as they
are to the single cause of adultery are outmoded and archaic. They promote all manner
of sordid arrangements both in and out of the state. They promote perjurous testimony.
Hence, they foster disrespect for the law which the courts are powerless to halt. The
continued disclosure of evidence of adultery procured in violation of fundamental civil
liberties thus works a double harm upon the integrity of the judicial process."
